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1 Introduction 
Since the inception of the GATT and now the World Trade Organisation (WTO)1, 
Member countries have been allowed to conclude customs unions and free trade 
areas. (FTAs)2 as an exception to the fundamental principle of non-discrimination set 
                                                          
* This paper is derived from a thesis submitted in fulfilment of LLD studies 
** A Saurombe. LLB (Fort Hare), LLM (UWC, Amsterdam Law School). LLD candidate, North West 
University (Potchefstroom) Senior Lecturer, Mercantile Law Department, University of South 
Africa (sauroa@unisa.ac.za). 
1    Hereafter "WTO". 
2 
    Hereafter "FTA". Article XXIV:8 stipulates the requirement for customs union and free-trade area 
as follows: For the purposes of this Agreement: (a) A customs union shall be understood to mean 
the substitution of a single customs territory for two or more customs territories, so that (i) duties 
and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except, where necessary, those permitted under 
Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated with respect to substantially all the trade 
between the constituent territories of the union or at least with respect to substantially all the trade 
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out in the most favoured nation provision of Article 1(MFN).3 During the Uruguay 
Round, Article XXIV was clarified to some extent and updated by an understanding 
on its interpretation.4 The Southern African Development Community (SADC)5 is a 
Regional Trade Agreement (RTA)6 established under GATT Article XXIV.7  The 
historical underlying scheme behind the provisions in Article XXIV was that the 
GATT would as a rule allow formation of an RTA but only as a reward for fully 
fledged liberalisation in the form of either a customs union or an FTA among the 
constituent members.8 This paper seeks to investigate and evaluate SADC's 
compliance with GATT Article XXIV provisions. Since the legal regime for trade in 
services is still in its infancy in SADC, the focus of this discussion is restricted to 
trade in goods. The exercise of determining SADC's compliance with Article XXIV 
will prove difficult and may not produce conclusive results since Article XXIV itself is 
clouded in controversy. The GATT Treaty's loopholes for FTAs in Article XXIV has 
puzzled and deceived prominent scholars.9 It has been criticised for being extremely 
elastic.10 This means that it can be stretched to undesirable limits. It is also 
'unusually complex' and is branded 'a failure, if not a fiasco'.11 It is difficult to 
understand and its application also produces complex results. The meaning also 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
in products originating in such territories, and, (ii) subject to the provisions of paragraph 9, 
substantially the same duties and other regulations of commerce are applied by each of the 
members of the union to the trade of territories not included in the union; (b) A free-trade area 
shall be understood to mean a group of two or more customs territories in which the duties and 
other restrictive regulations of commerce (except, where necessary, those permitted under 
Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated on substantially all the trade between the 
constituent territories in products originating in such territories. 
3 
     Hereafter referred to as "MFN". Under the MFN Principle WTO members cannot normally 
discriminate between their trading partners. If one member grants to another a special favour 
(such as a lower customs duty rate for one of their products) that member has to do the same for 
all other WTO members. 
4     See Doha Ministerial Meeting 2001: Briefing notes WTO Website 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/brief_e/brief20_e.htm accessed 20 May 
2011. The interpretation's main principle is that the   purpose of an RTA should be to facilitate 
trade between the constituent countries and not to raise barriers to the trade of other WTO 
members not parties to the RTA. This understanding has made it clear that a question as to 
whether Article XXIV is being followed by any member when it forms a Preferential Trade Area 
(SADC is one) can be brought before the Dispute Settlement Body. This clarification is vital as the 
examination of PTAs by contracting parties during the GATT years could not yield any noticeable 
result in ensuring their consistency with GATT rules. 
5   Hereafter "SADC". 
6    Hereafter "RTA". 
7 
   Article XXIV: 7(a). 
8    Park 'Regionalism, Open Regionalism'. 263  
9   Chase 'Multilateralism compromised' 1-30. 
10
    Curzon Multilateral Commercial Diplomacy 367. 
11   Dam The GATT: Law and International Economic Organisation 392 
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gets lost in this complexity. Bhagwati12 describes it as 'full of holes'. Its language is 
full of 'ambiguities' and 'vague phrases', adding that it is an 'absurdity' and a 
'contradiction'.13 Notwithstanding these criticisms levelled against Article XXIV, this 
paper will attempt to establish SADC's compliance with selected GATT Article XXIV 
provisions. This is of critical importance since Article XXIV remains the most effective 
tool in regulating the growing contentious relationship between regionalism that 
manifests itself in FTAs and customs unions vis-a-vis the multilateral trading system 
as championed by the WTO.  
2. Background 
2.1 Regionalism vs. Multilateralism 
The question of whether RTAs have functioned as 'building blocks or 'stumbling 
blocks' in the multilateral process has been subjected of too much debate in recent 
years. Those believing in the negative effects of the regionalism drive point out its 
potential to fragment multilateralism. The argument is that when these blocks 
expand, their market power and influence is widespread, providing an incentive to 
use trade policy to restrict imports. This argument identifies customs unions and 
FTAs as the potential trade blocks that can cause this adverse effect. However, 
there is no evidence to date that suggest RTAs have pursued this incentive to raise 
external barriers. The sudden increase of RTAs has also led to the establishment of 
parallel and overlapping dispute settlement forums between the RTAs and the WTO. 
RTAs have the potential to build up jurisprudence conflicting with that of the WTO. 
However the existence of a relationship between regionalism and multilateralism is 
very important for global trade governance. It can be argued that RTAs, by moving at 
a faster pace than WTO rules while sharing the WTO's goals, strengthens the latter. 
It also has to be realised that RTAs, being small in nature, can be more effective in 
tackling new areas such as services, investment, intellectual property protection, 
cooperation in competition policy, technical standards and government procurement 
than multilateral rule-making. These so called new generation issues are the core 
issues deadlocking the Doha Development Agenda. 
                                                          
12
    Bhagwati Regionalism and Multilateralism 22. 
13   Haight 'Customs Unions and Free Trade Areas'. 1-35 
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2.2 Importance of WTO rules for regional integration 
From the outset it is worth noting that in international law there is no hierarchy 
among treaties, except for the supremacy of the Charter of the United Nations over 
any other international agreement, as expressly provided for in Article 103 of the 
Charter.14 Given this basis, one may argue that in the event of conflict between any 
rules of the WTO and the RTA, there is no clear-cut hierarchy among them since 
both belong to the same category of international treaties. Accordingly, their 
relationship would be determined in the light of Article 30 of the Vienna Convention. 
However, the fallacy in the approach of resorting to Article 30 and equating similar 
status to RTAs and WTO rules would be evident if we take into account the 
provisions of Article 41(1) of the Vienna Convention. As Article XXIV of the GATT 
allows the execution of international treaties in the form of customs unions and 
FTAs, by virtue of Article 41(1) of the Vienna Convention, the latter kind of treaties 
could modify the provisions of the former only if it is allowed by the former.15  
Therefore the argument is tenable that Article 41(1) implies that the WTO rules are 
inherently of a higher rank than RTAs.16 What this means is that RTAs are 
subservient to the rules of the WTO in the same manner as ordinary legislation of 
parliament in a domestic legal context would be to provisions of the constitution.17  
The fact that this debate exists highlights how important it is that WTO rules 
governing the establishment of RTAs should neutralise their adverse systemic 
effects on the multilateral trading system. Article XXIV has opened the space where 
RTAs could blossom and enter into competition with the multilateral system. The 
focus will now be directed on a number of rules by which RTAs have to abide before 
WTO approval for such arrangements is granted. At the same time an analysis of 
some of the controversies around these rules is undertaken. 
3. Selected criteria to be met by SADC and other RTAs in a similar position 
The selected prescribed criteria of Art XXIV to be discussed include the notification 
requirement, the neutrality of trade restrictiveness requirement, the substantially all 
                                                          
14   See Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations and Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties. 
15  Cottier and Foltea 'Constitutional Functions of the WTO and Regional Trade Agreements' 43. 
16
   Ibid 
17    Ibid 
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trade requirement, and the prescribed transitional period. These will be discussed in 
detail below. 
3.1 The Notification requirement 
All RTAs concluded by WTO Member countries require notification. Those RTAs 
involving developing countries like SADC have the option to be notified under the 
Enabling Clause while those involving developed countries are sent to the 
Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA)18 for examination. Some WTO 
Members argue that the Enabling Clause is not appropriate to deal with RTAs which 
take the form of either a customs union or an FTA which should be covered by 
Article XXIV. According to this view, the Enabling Clause should be confined to 
preferential trade agreements which stop short of an FTA or customs union. 
Article XXIV paragraph 7 sets the obligation for parties to an RTA to notify other 
members and to make available to them; 
such information regarding the proposed union or area as will 
enable them to make such reports and recommendations to 
contracting parties19 
 
3.1.1 The Transparency Mechanism20 
On 14 December 2006, the WTO General Council established on a provisional basis 
a new transparency mechanism for all RTAs. The new transparency mechanism 
negotiated in the Negotiating Group on Rules provides for early announcement of 
any RTA and notification to the WTO.21 The Transparency Mechanism clarifies and 
                                                          
18   The CRTA's terms of reference can be found in WT/L/127. Available on: 
     http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/regcom_e.htm. 
Accessed 06/06/2011 The WTO General Council established the Committee on Regional Trade 
Agreements in 1996. Its two principal duties are to examine individual regional agreements and to 
consider the systemic implications of the agreements for the multilateral trading system and the 
relationship between them. The Protocol is supposed to be subjected to the criteria set out by the 
CRTA of 1996. Furthermore the Transparency Mechanism of 2006 is based on the two principle 
duties of CRTA OF 2006; hence the SADC Protocol on Trade of 2000 is subjected to the 
transparency criteria. 
19    Article XXIV, paragraph 7 (a) 
20    For the latest version of the Transparency Mechanism as approved by the WTO General Council 
Decision December 2010 WT/L/806 
21  Hoekman and  Mavroidis  'WTO Dispute Settlement, Transparency and Surveillance' 1. 
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strengthens the notification obligations of WTO Members and introduces new 
procedures to enhance the transparency of RTAs.22 There was widespread 
acknowledgement among Members that the existing RTAs surveillance mechanism 
was largely ineffective.23 Evidence show that over the CRTAs five years of existence 
the quality of the Standard Formats and statistics information provided by members 
had varied considerably. Some members had provided detailed statistics at the tariff 
line level to support the examination process, but others had expressed themselves 
unable or unwilling to do so.24 
Under the New Transparency Mechanism members will consider the notified RTAs 
on the basis of a factual presentation by the WTO Secretariat. The CRTA will 
consider RTAs falling under Article XXIV of GATT and Article V of the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). The Committee on Trade and 
Development will consider RTAs falling under the Enabling Clause (trade 
arrangements between developing countries). The transparency mechanism is 
implemented on a provisional basis and is to be replaced by a permanent 
mechanism to be adopted as part of the Doha Round of Trade Negotiations.25 
Members are to review, and if necessary modify, the decision, and replace it by a 
permanent mechanism adopted as part of the overall results of the Doha Round. 
Upon notification, and without affecting members' rights and obligations under the 
WTO agreements under which it has been notified, the RTA shall be considered by 
Members under the procedures established in paragraphs 6 to 13 of the 
Transparency Mechanism for RTAs. 
According to the Transparency Mechanism member parties to a newly signed RTA 
shall convey to the WTO, in so far as and when it is publicly available, information on 
the RTA, including its official name, scope and date of signature, any foreseen 
timetable for its entry into force or provisional application, relevant contact points 
                                                          
22
   Crawford 'A New Transparency Mechanism' 133-140 
23
  Ibid 
24
   Ibid 
25  WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 14 November 2001.Par 47 of the Doha  Ministerial Declaration Available on:  
  http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/ministe/min01e/mindecl_e.htm Accessed 20 July 2010 
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and/or website addresses and any other unrestricted information.26Upon receipt of 
this information the WTO Secretariat will post it on the WTO website and will 
periodically provide members with a synopsis of the communications received. This 
requirement is important because it promotes transparency and fairness in global 
trade.27 This purpose is highlighted here; 
Upon receiving information concerning the RTAs, other WTO 
members are entitled to make recommendations, which the RTA 
parties should be ready to abide to.28  
The need for notification of a FTA, customs union or interim agreement to the WTO 
is clearly stated and emphasised.29   The required notification of an RTA by members 
that are party to it shall take place as early as possible. As a rule, it will occur no later 
than directly following the parties' ratification of the RTA or any party's decision on 
application of the relevant parts of an agreement, and before the application of 
preferential treatment between the parties. The weakness of this provision is that no 
adequate guidance is given as to when notification should be made to the WTO. It 
has been customary since the 1950s for WTO members to notify the WTO after the 
RTA they formed has been adopted in Member States legislative system. This 
procedure is logical given that it removes the risk of the regional arrangement being 
rejected by domestic legislatures after it has obtained the approval of the WTO. 
However, notification of an RTA does not equate with approval.  
The WTO Council is against this practice.30 It insists that prompt notification requires 
that Member States of the regional organisation promptly notify the WTO of the 
arrangement after it has been signed by all contracting parties. This has to be done 
so that such an arrangement can be on the agenda of the Council's first meeting 
after the signing of the regional arrangement; however, RTAs appear on the 
                                                          
26
  WTO WT/L/671 16 Dec 2006. This forms part of the feature of 'early announcement'. There is no 
obligation in Article XXIV to announce agreements early. 
27
  A list of notified RTAs is available on: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/status_e.xls 
accessed 20 May 2011. 
28   Article XXIV, paragraph 7 (b)  This is the case only for agreements which are notified to the WTO 
as 'interim agreements'. In practice, WTO members do not notify their RTAs of interim 
agreements. 
29  Article XXIV of GATT, paragraphs 7 and 23 of the Transparency Merchanism. In notifying their 
RTA, the parties shall specify under which provision(s) of the WTO agreement it is notified. They 
will also provide the full text of the RTA and any related schedules, annexes and protocols, in one 
of the WTO official languages; if available, these shall also be submitted in an electronically 
exploitable format. Reference to related official Internet links shall also be supplied. 
30
   Clarified under paragraph 3 of the Transparency Mechanism. 
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Council's agenda for information purposes only. The Council's position is meant to 
encourage Member States to enter into arrangements which provide a shorter time 
period between the signing of the agreement and its coming into force.31  
3.1.2 Compliance with notification in SADC 
On 2 August 2004, SADC notified the Protocol on Trade in the Southern African 
Development Community and the Amending Agreement to the Protocol to the WTO 
under Article XXIV:7(a) of the GATT 1994, as aiming at establishing a free trade 
area.32 SADC would have also qualified to notify under Paragraph 4 (b) of the 
Enabling Clause since the RTA involves developing countries. The terms of 
reference for the examination of the Protocol were adopted by the Council for Trade 
in Goods on 1 October 2004.33  The text of the Protocol and the Amendment Protocol 
were circulated to WTO Members as documents WT/REG176/1 and 
WT/REG176/2/Rev.134 The SADC Trade Protocol entered into force in the year 
2000; hence the notification date of 2004 means notification was not strictly complied 
with.35 
Reasons for the delayed notification could be that some SADC Members were 
unhappy that the Protocol on trade provides no favourable solution to the problems 
faced by the region. They were afraid of industrial polarisation and trade diversion. 
Despite these suggested reasons notification is a requirement that has to be fulfilled 
'as early as possible'... no later than directly following the parties ratification of the 
RTA or any party's decision on application of the relevant parts of an agreement, and 
'before' the application of preferential treatment between the parties. In practice this 
means that WTO Members have to be informed before the implementation of the 
RTA. 
                                                          
31    Kumar 'Article XXIV' 4 
32    (WT/REG176/N/1/Rev.1) The delegation from the Tanzanian Mission presided over the 
notification. 
33    WT/REG176/3 Protocol on Trade in the Southern African Development Community. Notification 
from Tanzania (WT/REG176/N/1 and Rev.1, WT/REG176/1, WT/REG176/2). 
34    Available, together with their Annexes, on the SADC Official website (http://www.sadc.int) 
35
   See note 14 above for clarity. The purpose of notification is also to allow other WTO members to  
be informed about the creation of an RTA that may impact on their trade relations with the 
members of such an RTA; for example the effects of trade diversion whereby efficient export 
suppliers outside the customs union are replaced by inefficient suppliers within the customs 
union. The period of 4 years between the signing of the protocol and its notification defeats the 
purpose of such notification. 
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Prompt notification of subsequent changes in the SADC RTA has not been done; 
hence in practical terms SADC is in violation of the notification requirement because 
some years have passed without notification of the proposed customs union.36 This 
is not just unique to SADC. The obligation for notification has not been complied with 
in a systematic manner by WTO Members and Crawford37 notes that; 
While the wording of GATT Article XXIV suggests that an RTA should 
be notified before the entry into force of the RTA, notifications are 
generally received after entry into force, in some cases months or even 
years after. 
 
3.2 Article XXIV: 5(a) Neutrality of trade restrictiveness requirement. 
This Article refers to customs unions. According to it, the 'duties and other 
regulations of commerce' imposed at the institutions of any such union...in respect of 
trade with contracting parties not parties to such union or arrangement shall not on 
the whole be higher or more restrictive than the general incidence of duties and 
regulations of commerce applicable in the constituent territories prior to the formation 
of such union...'. In cases of FTAs, Article XXIV: 5(b) makes the same requirement 
for the trade policy of each of the countries which are party to such an agreement. 
According to the 1994 Understanding tariffs and duties evaluation should be based 
on an overall assessment of weighted average tariff rates and of customs union 
duties collected. This calculation is done by the WTO Secretariat based on import 
statistics for a previous representative period on a tariff line basis using the 
methodology used to compute the tariff offers in the Uruguay Round negotiations. It 
is critically important that the duties and charges taken into consideration should be 
applied rates of duty. Individual examination for non-tariff measures should be 
undertaken to assess whether their overall trade restrictiveness has increased or 
decreased.  
3.2.1 Analysis of the meaning of 'Duties and Other Regulations of Commerce?'38 
                                                          
36  If the transparency mechanism is strictly complied with the whole plan to establish an FTA (2008) 
or customs union (2010) should have been notified to the WTO as part of the subsequent 
notification. 
37
   Crawford, (note 23 above) p6 
38    Here after ORCs 
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There is a direct correlation between Article XXIV 5(a)39, 5(b)40 and 8(a) (ii) and sub-
paragraph 8(a) (i) and 8(b) on the words 'duties and other regulation of commerce'. 
Sub-paragraph 5(a) and 8(a) (ii) form a coherent pair, both dealing with customs 
unions. According to sub-paragraph 8(a) (ii), the parties to a customs union must 
'substantially' harmonise duties and other regulations of commerce applied to the 
trade of countries that are not part of the RTA, whether or not they are WTO 
Members. Sub-paragraph 5(a) requires that the newly harmonised ORCs plus any 
remaining un-harmonised ORCs applied in respect of trade with WTO Members that 
are not party to the RTA be no more restrictive than the ORCs previously applied in 
respect of such trade. 
Examples of the regulation of commerce that could potentially constitute ORCs, 
include border measures41 regulating either the import of goods from third countries 
or the export of goods to third countries or the export of goods to third countries, and 
marketplace measures that may be applicable solely to the goods of third countries, 
to the goods of both third countries and RTA parties, or solely to the goods of RTA 
parties. During  the Uruguay Round, one proposal was that the words 'duties and 
other regulations of commerce' should be interpreted to cover 'all border  measures 
taken in connection with importation or exportation which have a differential impact 
on imported products as compared to domestic products.42 This proposal was 
rejected due to the inclusion of the word 'exportation', among other things. This might 
suggest that the negotiators did not agree that ORCs include export measures. A 
further difficulty with interpreting ORCs as including border measures on exports is 
                                                          
39  
 The duties and other regulations of commerce imposed at the institution of a customs union in  
respect to trade with WTO members not part to such union…shall not on the whole be higher or 
more restrictive than the general incidence of the duties and regulations of commerce applicable 
in the constituent territories prior to the formation of such union. 
40 
 The duties and other regulations of commerce maintained in each of the constituent territories 
and applicable at the formation of an FTA to trade of WTO members not included in such 
area…shall not be higher or more restrictive than the corresponding duties and other regulations 
of commerce existing in the same constituent territories prior to the formation of the FTA. 
41    This relates to ORCs relevant to sub-paragraphs 5(a) 5 (b) and 8(a) (ii) of Article XXIV, these 
measures being applied to external trade. Examples are custom duties and similar charges, 
import prohibitions, quantitative restrictions and administrative rules regulating importation. 
Administrative rules include rules of origin used to distinguish between imports of goods 
originating in an RTA party and those originating in a third country. Border measures that restrict 
exports from RTA parties to third countries are more problematic. 
42    WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Systemic Issues Related to 'Other Regulations 
of Commerce': Background Note by Secretariat(Revision) WT/REG/W/17/Rev1(5 February 1998) 
para10 
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that such measures are generally applied by RTA parties to their own goods when 
destined for third country markets and therefore cannot be described as being 
applicable or applied to the trade of third countries within the meaning of Article 
XXIV:5 (b) and 8 (a) (ii). 
With this provision GATT wanted to make sure that trade liberalisation continues 
even within the confines of an exception that created RTAs. This requirement 
concerns in principle the trade diversion effects to non members of the RTA. It has 
also been controversial. Preferential treatment provided to a partner country in an 
RTA leads to a reduction of demand for products from non-member countries even 
though external tariffs are not raised. Besides the compensation in the case of 
raising external tariff rates, the GATT fails to address such trade diversion and 
ignores the impacts such arrangements might have on outsiders even when they do 
not raise external tariffs. 
McMillan43 has proposed one way to effectively avoid trade diversion. He suggests 
that any RTAs have to design external barriers, so that the volume of trade with the 
outside remains at least at the old level. With agreements leading to FTA or customs 
unions which inherently contain preferential market access provisions to member 
countries, this would be made possible by a corresponding reduction of external 
barriers. Like this proposal is the one raised by Bhagwati,44 suggesting that the 
lowest pre-union tariff be adopted as a common external tariff.45 By eliminating the 
effects of trade diversion, this proposal would confine the effects of preferential 
agreements to trade creation, leading to the improvement of welfare for the countries 
involved. 
Furthermore another merit of McMillan's proposal is that its implementation would 
provide the members of RTAs with an incentive to continue expanding membership 
                                                          
43    McMillan 'Does Regional Integration Foster Open Trade' 1-30 
44
    Bhagwati (note 13 above) p3 
45  Adopting this rule would make countries with low tariffs less attractive partners for a CU, and 
would thus lead to a reduction in the number of RIAs. However, high tariff countries will also be 
inclined to form CUs, strengthening the trade diversion effect. It will be interesting to follow what 
situation will arise in SADC where a proposed CU is due in 2010. Some SADC countries still have 
high tariffs while others have gone as low as zero. SACU tariffs, by virtue of its being a CU, are 
very low, while Mauritius has even fewer tariffs. If this rule were to be followed, the lowest tariffs 
that would have to be adopted for the SADC CU would be those of Mauritius. This is unlikely 
since some SADC members still rely heavily on tariffs for revenue. 
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of the agreement until all of the important trading partners are included. If adopted by 
the WTO as a governing principle of regionalism, and the effect mentioned above 
comes to be realised, then this proposal has the potential to become an important 
instrument to widen the possibility for regionalism to become open regionalism, 
leading eventually to the strengthening of multilateralism. 
However this proposition has its own shortcomings. There are both conceptual and 
practical challenges. In reality, in order to implement MacMillan's suggestion, 
countries should know, prior to the agreement, what kind of compensation they 
would have to pay. It is even more alarming to realise that there will inevitably be 
greater uncertainty about the extent of trade diversion likely to occur. Moreover, after 
the agreement comes into effect, separating the effects occurring because of trade-
diverting aspects of the agreement from other economic changes will be difficult, 
because a reduction in imports from the rest of the world may be influenced by other 
factors too. Additionally, RTAs could have dynamic effects that could lead to 
increased intra-RTA investment flows and to accelerating economic growth. This is 
highly likely to happen in a RTA like SADC, where there is one very strong and 
dominant economy, that of South Africa, that could increase intra-RTA investments.46 
In the final analysis, therefore, outsiders could gain from increased imports induced 
by higher income generated by these dynamic effects, even though in the short term 
they might lose as a result of trade diversion. 
 3.2.2 Fulfilling the requirement of less restrictive tariffs or policies in SADC 
In fulfilling this requirement SADC Member States may apply export duties, provided 
that third parties are not granted less favourable treatment than Member States.47 In 
addition, when dealing with intra-SADC trade, Member States shall adopt policies 
and implement measures which will lead to the elimination of all existing forms of 
non-tariff barriers.48 Accordingly Member States must also refrain from imposing any 
new non-tariff barriers. This is to be the general policy unless the Protocol provides 
otherwise.49 Even though this shows compliance on the part of SADC, the fulfilment 
                                                          
46    This aspect has already been emphasised in the discussion of the role of South Africa in chapter 
6. 
47
    Article 5 of the SADC Protocol on Trade 
48
    Ibid 
49
    Article 6 of the SADC Protocol on Trade 
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of this requirement is difficult to measure; non-tariff barriers are still very high in the 
region.50  
The GATT also advocates the removal of qualitative restrictions: Member States 
shall not apply new qualitative restrictions. According to the Trade Protocol, existing 
restrictions on imports originating in Member States will instead be phased out.51 Any 
deviation from this understanding will otherwise have to be provided for by the SADC 
Protocol on Trade.52 The levying of quantitative restrictions on exports to other 
Member States is also prohibited unless it is provided for by the Protocol. An 
exception is, however, provided for Member States to take measures necessary to 
prevent the erosion of any prohibitions or restrictions which apply to exports outside 
the community as long as third parties are not granted less favourable treatment 
than Member States.53 
Even the general exception clause does not deviate from the spirit of trade 
liberalisation in the Protocol on Trade. Further, even more importantly the exception 
does not seem to be in conflict with WTO regulations. The exception actually 
confirms compliance with the WTO obligations. The general exception reads as 
follows; 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in 
a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between Member States, or a 
disguised restriction on intra-SADC trade, nothing in Article 7 and 
8 of this Protocol shall be construed as to prevent the adoption or 
enforcement of any measures by a Member State;54 
a) necessary to secure compliance with laws and regulations which 
are consistent with the WTO; 
b) necessary to protect intellectual property rights,  or to  prevent 
deceptive trade practices; or 
c) necessary to ensure compliance with existing obligations under 
international agreements'55 
 
                                                          
50    World Bank, Africa Trade Policy, November 2010 Available on: http://agritrade.cta.int/en/Key-
topics/EPA-negotiations/Regional/SADC-configuration/News/SADC-trade-policy-Agriculture-
related-non-tariff-barriers-fragment-regional-markets Accessed 06/06/2011 
51
    Article 3 of the SADC Protocol on Trade 
52
    Article 7 of the SADC Protocol on Trade 
53
    Article 8 of the SADC Protocol on Trade 
54
    Ibid 
55
    Article 9 SADC Protocol on Trade (1996) This Article also contains all the remaining  provisions 
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In concluding this discussion on the requirement that new trade restrictions need to 
be 'not on the whole higher' than those that existed before the formation of the RTA, 
it is important to realise that there are shortcomings in the interpretation of this 
requirement. The proposed solutions also have their own shortcomings, therefore it 
is not easy to make recommendations or give a final decision about whether or not 
the provisions should really be reformed. If the GATT rule is maintained, it should be 
regarded as a minimum restriction on new RTAs. A reduction of external tariffs is 
desirable in global liberalisation, but in the current setting that is what the RTAs by 
themselves have to decide, either in a voluntary manner or as influenced by 
pressure from trading partners. Here, the potential of open regionalism to contribute 
to the strengthening of multilateralism can be identified; if there is a sufficient number 
of countries willing to exchange liberalisation, members of an RTA may be pressured 
to do the same, thus leaving regionalism open to outsiders.56 
3.3 Article XXIV: 8(b): The substantially all trade coverage requirement. 
According to this Article, duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce, except 
as otherwise permitted under GATT rules, should be eliminated on substantially all 
trade between the constituent territories.57 
3.3.1 Analysis of the elimination of barriers on the 'substantially all trade' requirement 
The meaning of 'substantially all trade' in Article XXIV:8 has given rise to much 
discussion over the years.58  To date, WTO Members have been unable to agree on 
the proportion of trade that amounts to 'substantially all trade',59 or how 'all trade' 
within an RTA is to be measured.60 According to the provisions of Article XXIV61, all 
                                                          
56
    Park (note 9 above) 265.  
57
  Article 5:1 of GATS has similar language that an agreement should have substantial sectoral 
coverage, which is defined in terms of the number of sectors, the volume of trade affected and 
the modes of supply 
58    Lockhart and Mitchell 'Regional Trade Agreements' 232 
59  In view of the many difficulties surrounding the word 'substantially' New Zealand has suggested 
that the word should be removed from Article XXIV:8: WTO Committee on Regional Trade 
Agreements, Note on the Meeting of 16-18 and 20 February 1998,WT/REG/M/16(18 March) para 
115 
60  WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Coverage, Liberalisation Process and 
Transitional Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements: Background survey by the Secretariat, 
WT/REG/W/46(5 April 2002) 
61  Sub paragraph 8 (a) refers to customs unions whose duties and other restrictive regulations of 
commerce (except where necessary, those permitted under Articles XI,XII,XIII.XIV,XX) are 
eliminated with respect to substantially all the trade between the constituent territories of the 
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restrictive duties and regulations of commerce should be 'eliminated on substantially 
all trade' between the contracting parties to the regional trading agreement, and 
where the parties choose to adopt a common external tariff and trade policy, such 
should be 'no more restrictive than the policies/tariffs of the individual states prior' to 
the formation of the trading block.62 The main objective of Article XXIV was to 
prevent RTAs from becoming obstacles to the development of multilateral trade, but 
rather to make them a stepping-stone towards open trade. According to Article XXIV 
paragraph 8, RTAs (be they free trade agreements or customs unions) should result 
in the elimination of duties and non-tariff barriers on 'substantially all the trade'. As 
will be shown in the next section, this provision has proved to be one of the most 
contentious and difficult to define.  
3.3.2 Fulfilling the 'Substantially all trade' requirement 
The elimination of tariffs on substantially all trade is a requirement that has openly 
been questioned. The question is 'what amounts to substantially all trade?' The 
requirement to liberalise 'substantially all trade' within an RTA has been criticised by 
many analysts. According to Bhagwati63 
This notion needs clarification because it is not clearly defined 
how much 'all' is 'substantially' all. This ambiguity is likely to lead 
to loopholes, thereby contributing to exclusion in related 
agreements of sensitive sectors such as agriculture and steel. To 
avoid this kind of loophole, it is suggested that the notion be 
changed into a phrase that requires liberalisation of 'all the trade'. 
Setting a certain percentage, for instance 80% percent or 90% of 
liberalisation across all sectors can also be considered as 
alternative to the 'all the trade' requirements. 
What this means is that there is a need to clarify and specify the 'substantially all 
trade' requirement. The two suggestions of reform discussed above will contribute to 
successfully mitigating the regionalist tendency of the current world economy, but 
they also entail shortcomings. The suggestions of Bhagwati, for instance, seem to be 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
union or at least with respect to substantially all the trade in products originating in such 
territories. For FTAs, the corresponding requirement is contained in Article XXIV:8 (b) referring to 
duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except where necessary, those permitted 
under Article XI,XII,XIII,XIV,XV and XX) are eliminated on substantially all the trade between the 
constituent territories in products originating in such territories. 
62    Sub paragraph 8 (a) (i) See discussion in Kumar U (assisted by Blumberg L) Article XXIV of 
GATT and Regional Arrangements in Southern Africa (1995) at 3 
63   Bagwati (note 13 above) 25. 
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too ambitious and idealistic and it is also uncertain that a total elimination of trade 
restrictions will increase overall welfare.64 In regions like SADC and many other 
African RTAs where intra-regional trade is significantly low, the removal of tariffs 
would not result in the increase of welfare. If adopted by the WTO, Bhagwati's 
suggestion could also be expected to give rise to unfair treatment between the 
existing and new regionalism. On the other hand, it considers only the liberalisation 
of RTAs and includes insufficient consideration of deep integration, which is one of 
the main effects of regional economic integration. 
 
3.3.3 Selected WTO jurisprudence on the meaning of 'substantially all trade' 
Appellate body panels have been called to interpret this term in dispute settlement. 
Up to now no panel has provided a satisfactory and detailed interpretation. A few 
cases will be described here in showing this trend. In theTurkey-Textiles case; 
the Appellate body's interpretation was that 'substantially all trade' is not 
the same as all trade but that 'it is something considerably more than 
merely some of trade'.65 
This interpretation means that the relevant amount of trade falls somewhere between 
some and all trade among the RTA parties. In the case involving the US-Line Pipe, 
the United States submitted evidence that NAFTA eliminated 'duties on 97 percent of 
the Parties' tariff lines, representing more than 99 percent of trade among them in 
terms of volume'.66 In this case the Panel held that the United States had established 
a prima facie case that NAFTA met the definition of an FTA under Article XXIV:8(b)67 
This decision was made after the review of the evidence given and without offering 
an opinion on the meaning of 'substantially all trade'. The Appellate Body took the 
view that it was not necessary to address it and declared it to be of no legal effect.68 
                                                          
64  Frankel Regional Trading Blocks 12. His analysis is convincingly illustrative in this respect.  His 
econometric model generates more favourable welfare effects in the case of partial liberalisation 
than in the case of total liberalisation. Based on this result, he argues that a removal of 100% 
intra-block trade barriers may not need strict enforcement, although he recognises the danger of 
accepting partial liberalisation as a rule. 
65    Appellate Body Report, Turkey-Textiles, paragraph 48 
66
    Panel report, US-Line Pipe, para 7.142 
67    Ibid para 7.144. 
68    Ibid paras 198-199. 
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If the panels and Appellate Body are left to decide on this notion they are likely to 
develop a flexible test premised on dividing the term into two. Firstly 'substantial' will 
be taken to indicate that the elimination of internal restrictions must cover a very 
considerable proportion of the trade between the parties. Secondly, the phrase 'all 
trade' will be used in identifying the broad base against which internal liberalisation is 
to be measured. This will ultimately lead to the panels' reaching a conclusion based 
on the specific facts at issue, each case being decided on the facts at hand. This 
jurisprudence could lead to an interpretation of what amount to 'substantially all 
trade' in SADC. 
3.3.4 Application of the 'Substantially all Trade' (SAT) interpretation in SADC 
In trying to fulfill the requirements listed above, the SADC Trade Protocol has made 
provisions for the phased elimination of tariffs and non-tariff barriers.69 The 
Committee of Ministers responsible for trade matters has determined the process to 
be followed for the phased elimination of tariffs and non-tariff barriers by doing the 
following;70 
a) prescribing an eight-year time frame for the elimination of barriers;71 
b) granting a period of grace to afford additional time to those Member States 
who are of the opinion that they may be or have been adversely affected by 
the removal of tariffs and non-tariff barriers;72 
c) Recognising that different tariff lines may be applied within the agreed time 
frame for different products in the process of eliminating tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers.73 
 
In fulfilling this requirement, the 85 percent threshold for the elimination of tariffs and 
non-tariff barriers was considered sufficient by SADC. To liberalise 80 percent to 90 
                                                          
69
    According to Article 3 of the SADC Trade Protocol, import duties on goods originating in Member 
States will be phased out gradually and eventually. 
70
    Article 3 of the SADC Trade Protocol (1996) 
71    Having been initiated in the year 2000, this was accomplished in 2008 with the launch of the FTA. 
72   In accordance with this provision SADC Member States like Angola and the DRC did not join the 
FTA at its launch; they sought additional time to adjust to the low tariffs since their economies 
depended heavily on tariffs for revenue. 
73  Article 3 (e), SADC Protocol on Trade. A Trade Negotiating Forum was responsible for 
negotiating the process and method of eliminating barriers to trade and the criteria to be followed 
for listing products for special consideration. 
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percent of total trade among member countries of an RTA may be in line with the 
welfare argument raised by Frankel,74 which established an econometric model 
generating favourable welfare effects through partial liberalisation rather than 
through a total liberalisation. Partial liberalisation is ideal for SADC, where the 
majority of the Member States still rely heavily on tariffs as a source of revenue.75 
Evidence is shown of the extent to which BLNS76 countries are dependent on the 
income from the SACU Revenue Pool,
 
which accounted for between 13% 
(Botswana), 28% (Namibia) and 51% (Lesotho and Swaziland) of total government 
income in 2001.77  Stern78 emphasises that; 
Revenue losses can arise as a direct effect of adopting a different tariff 
structure and in particular as a result of agreeing to apply no import 
tariffs to intra-group trade. 
Further problems are envisaged, in that trade volume in one sector is not the result 
of one single factor; trade impediments may also influence trade relations. 
Consequently, it will not be easy to identify the product lines for which tariffs should 
be eliminated to reach the specified percentage. Additionally, shifts in demand and 
supply may affect the trade flows differently, which would also make it quite 
impossible to reach the exact value of the 80 to 90 percent for all trade. This 
situation has manifested itself in SADC as illustrated hereunder. 
The 85 percent duty-free threshold was the target SADC set before launching the 
FTA.79 The interpretation of this provision is open to criticism since there is no 
prescribed formula for reaching such a threshold. SADC managed to reach the 85 
percent threshold only by working out an average calculation covering all Member 
States. There was no uniform reduction of tariffs within SADC and Member countries 
failed to implement targets.80 In fact the 85 percent was made possible only because 
the SACU Members who are also SADC Members had very low tariffs, reaching zero 
                                                          
74    Frankel (note 65 above) 16 
75 
   Kirk and Stern ‚The New Southern African Customs Union Agreement' 29-52 
76    BLNS countries are Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland. 
77 
  (WTO 2003b:7) Trade Policy Review. '. Doc. WT/TPR/G/114, Geneva. 
78   Stern 'Evaluation of an Appropriate Model for SADC' 50 
79    FTA Brochure 'Hand book on SADC FTA, Growth, Development and Wealth Creation'. Available 
on www.sadc.in/fta/index/browse/page/219 Accessed on:  20 August 2010, See also the SADC 
Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP). 
80
    Niyiragira 'SADC Countries Fail to Meet Customs Union', Comment by Paul Kruger, a Tralac 
Researcher at the Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa (Tralac). Available on: 
http://www.pambazuka.org/aumonitor/comments/2538/ Accessed 20 August 2010 
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in many instances. Since the SACU is already a Customs Union with very low tariffs, 
its contribution to the 85 percent average was enormous. This brings into question 
the rationale behind the requirement for the elimination of tariffs. Is the purpose to 
increase trade within the trade agreement? Even though there are valid reasons for 
accepting an asymmetrical approach to tariff liberalisation, the elimination of tariffs 
should be implemented equally across the board, especially considering that SADC 
Member States other than South Africa have poor economies. 
Since the 'substantially all trade requirement' is not clear and SADC has reached an 
exceptional level of tariff elimination, this requirement has been complied with. The 
term 'substantially' implies that not all trade has necessarily to be covered. It is 
therefore argued that there is sufficient flexibility for some of the trade to be left 
outside of the coverage of liberalisation. The parties would have discretion as to 
which part of their total trade to liberalise.81 How much trade can be left outside of the 
coverage, however, remains an unanswered question. Additionally, another question 
could be what criteria should be used in the selection of products that form part or do 
not form part of the 'substantially all trade' category. Some Member States argue that 
'substantially all trade' should be represented by a quantitative benchmark such as 
the percentage of trade covered, and/or a percentage of the total number of tariff 
lines. It is also argued that a qualitative benchmark is necessary in addition to the 
quantitative one. A qualitative benchmark is generally defined as the absence of 
systematic exclusion of any major sectors such as agriculture or textile. The 
preamble of the Understanding on Article XXIV alludes to the importance of not 
excluding any sectors from liberalisation in order to maximise the benefits arising 
from RTAs. It notes that the positive contribution that RTAs can have through the 
expansion of world trade is increased if the elimination between the constituent 
territories of duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce extends to all trade, 
and is diminished if any sector of trade is excluded. 
African countries probably have an interest in a qualitative benchmark for trade 
coverage. Sectors and products where tariff peaks or restrictions to preferences are 
most commonly found are those where African countries have a comparative 
                                                          
81
  See WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Communication from Australia- Addendum 
WT/REG/W/22/Add.1(24 April 1998) 
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advantage (textile, agricultural products).The EU's interpretation of the 'substantially 
all trade'  requirement has traditionally been that liberalisation should extend to at 
least 90% of the existing trade between the members of an RTA. This 90% coverage 
can be split unevenly between RTA members in order to reflect development 
asymmetries. 
A calculation of the liberalisation granted by SADC members as a whole within the 
context of the Trade Protocol can be obtained by aggregating the duty-free tariff lines 
granted by each SADC member. In this formula SACU is counted as one, because it 
has already achieved a Customs Union status. The technique used is a simple 
average based on the total number of tariff lines and the total number of lines 
liberalised. Using this approach, calculations show that the overall liberalisation by 
SADC members amounts to 40.8 percent of tariff lines liberalised on entry into force 
of the Agreement. By 2015, when the last Member State, Mozambique, fully 
liberalises, it is assumed that the figure will rise to 99.7 percent. In terms of trade 
value (based on average 2002-2004 import values), overall liberalisation by SADC 
members amounted to 36.3 percent on entry into force. It is anticipated that it will 
reach 90.9 percent by the end of the implementation period.82  
There is no accepted formula to calculate substantially all trade in the WTO; hence 
SADC's formula is ungrounded. However, if one looks at the kind of products not 
covered by the 85 percent threshold, it becomes clear that the decision to exclude 
motor vehicles, motor vehicles parts, textiles and certain clothing materials points to 
the protection of such industries. As the only industrialised member within the region, 
South Africa is the Member which seeks to protect its motor vehicle manufacturing 
industry83 and its textile industry. The South African motor industry was one of South 
Africa's most heavily protected industries prior to the trade liberalisation programme 
that was launched in the 1990s84 but the levels of protection have not decreased to 
acceptable levels yet. Critically what this means is that South Africa is not willing to 
liberalise sectors where it has a comparative advantage. In some sense this 
suggests the continued existence in SADC of protectionist tendencies that are 
against the very objective of trade liberalisation. All of the other sectors forming the 
                                                          
82    This statistical analysis has been provided by the WTO Factual Presentation. 
83   See generally, Bell 'Content Protection'. 68-79 
84    Flatters and Netshitomboni 'Trade and Poverty in South Africa'. 22 
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85 percent threshold could also be in areas where other SADC Member States have 
comparative advantage. The argument now is that 'substantially all trade' should be 
as close to 100% as possible so that trade liberalisation benefits can be felt in the 
majority of the sectors and for all of the countries involved. The 'substantially all 
trade' requirement has been complicated by the interim EPA pact that gives several 
of the SADC countries different levels of liberalisation. For example, Botswana, 
Lesotho and Swaziland will liberalise 86% of trade by value and tariff lines by the 
start of 2010, while Mozambique will liberalise 80.5 % of trade.85 
In finalising the discussion on the debate on 'substantially all trade', the merits and 
shortcomings of the suggested interpretations give rise to constructive ambiguity. 
This prevents countries from applying selective and/or sectoral liberalisation in just a 
few areas. This effect is expected also to strengthen if the international organisation, 
which possesses the power to make rules and enforce them, has enough authority to 
judge on it. Therefore, it seems that the problem currently being experienced is not 
the ambiguity incorporated in the 'substantially all trade' requirement, but that there is 
yet to be found an appropriate governance system for regionalism to prevent the 
misuse of the existing rules.86 Furthermore even though the DSB of the WTO can 
always be used, Members have shied away from using it for a variety of reasons, not 
least the fact that virtually all WTO members are engaged in RTAs and any resulting 
jurisprudence may have negative effects on their own arrangements. This form of 
governance will be ideally relevant at both multilateral level (WTO)  and regionally 
(SADC and any other RTA) RTAs will have to find a better formula for the 
interpretation of 'substantially all trade', an interpretation that balances trade 
liberalisation equally both within and  outside the RTA. 
4. The prescribed transitional period 
Another unclear aspect of the WTO Article XXIV rules on RTAs pertains to the length 
of the transition period for interim agreements. Liberalisation within RTAs is 
commonly achieved by gradual tariff reduction. In such a circumstance, the interim 
agreement must include a plan or a schedule for the finalisation of the customs union 
                                                          
85
    Kruger 'SADC EPA negotiations'. 8-9 
86
   That the Committee on Regional Trading Arrangement (CRTA) which had been established   
within the WTO can take up this task needs still to be proved.  
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or Preferential Trade Area. As part of the Uruguay Round, WTO members agreed to 
the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994, which 
inter alia provides that a reasonable period of time shall be construed as not more 
than 10 years, without a full explanation of why a longer period of time is required in 
the interim agreement. The period between the entry into force of an RTA and 
complete liberalisation between its members is called an interim agreement. 
Paragraph 8(c) of Article XXIV states that: 
Interim agreements should be implemented '[…] within a reasonable 
length of time'. The Understanding on the interpretation of Article XXIV, 
paragraph 3 specifies: 'the reasonable length of time […] should 
exceed 10 years only in exceptional cases'. Furthermore, the same 
paragraph adds that such exceptional circumstances require '[…] a full 
explanation to the Council for Trade in Goods of the need for a longer 
period'. 
 
4.1 Compliance with transitional period in SADC 
SADC has complied with the implementation of a transitional period. SADC 
implemented the FTA after 8 years of phased tariff reduction, which is two years 
earlier than the specified limit. Notwithstanding the fact that a few members of SADC 
are not party to the FTA, its implementation in 8 years (from 2000 to 2008) means 
that those who have not implemented it had a grace period of two years and 2010 
was watershed year for the fulfilment of this requirement. SADC can still seek to 
extend the transitional period by approaching the CTG. This should be done in line 
with the decision by Mozambique and Zimbabwe to have fully complied with the FTA 
by 2015 and 2014 respectively. 
The current arrangements on RTAs thus leave some degree of flexibility for 
transition periods longer than 10 years.  However, the absence of any agreed 
definition of 'exceptional cases' and 'full explanation' leaves a high degree of 
uncertainty, which could jeopardise the legal security conferred by this flexibility. In 
existing North-South RTAs, transition periods sometimes exceed 10 years. For 
example, the Tunisia Euro-med agreement allows Tunisia up to 12 years to 
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liberalise,87 and South Africa is granted the same timeline to finalise its opening.88 
Egypt was granted 15 years to liberalise some products under its Euro-med 
agreements.89 Finally, in its agreement with Canada, Chile was given 19.5 years to 
achieve its liberalisation.90 Even though it was the members who granted themselves 
these long transition periods, the WTO neither endorsed nor prohibited the decision. 
This, therefore, remains a grey area. 
4.2 Transitional period in the context of Economic Partnership Agreements91 
SADC is one of the African, Pacific and Caribbean (ACP) countries/organisations 
that are in the process of concluding EPA agreements with the EU. The ACP-EU 
relationship was essentially a trade aid package that presented an innovation 
establishing a legal framework between a group of developing countries on the one 
hand and a group of developed countries on the other.92 The ACP-EU relationship 
has been in existence for just over twenty-five years and involves seventy-seven 
developing countries in all. Of these, forty-eight are African countries and thirty-nine 
are least developed countries.93 Under the ACP agreements the ACP countries had 
preferential market access in the form of duty-free entry or a duty that was 
                                                          
87   See generally Grethe, Nolte and Tangermann, “The Development and future of EU. See also 
Löfgren, H., El-Said, M. and Robinson, S. 'Trade Liberalisation and the Poor: A Dynamic Rural-
Urban General Equilibrium Analysis of Morocco', 2001 in Dessus, S.; Devlin, J. and Safadi, R. 
(eds.), 'Towards Arab and Euro-Med Regional Integration', 129 - 146. 
88 
  Greenberg S 'Raw Deal'. 16-19 
89
   Pierluigi 'The European Neighborhood' 45-64 See also McQueen M 'The EU's Free trade 
Agreement with developing countries: A case of wishful thinking?' 1369-85 
90 
 Kuwayama  and Yusuke  'The Comprehensiveness of Chilean Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)' 
2002, paper presented to the APEC Study Centre, Institute for Developing Economies, Japan 
External Trade Organisation (JETRO), for Project 'WTO Liberalisation and the FTA Framework', 
forthcoming. 2001 Chiba, Japan. 
91  Hereafter ACP countries.They are comprised of countries (currently 79: 48 African, 16 Caribbean 
and 15 Pacific), created by the Georgetown Agreement in 1975. The group's main objectives are 
sustainable development and poverty reduction within its member states, as well as their greater 
integration into the world's economy. All of the member states except Cuba are signatories to the 
Cotonou Agreement with the EU. The current wave of EPA negotiations and conclusions of 
agreements is an attempt to replace the Cotonou Agreement that was ruled to be illegal under 
WTO rules because of its non-reciprocity. See the WTO Panel ruling in the European Economic 
Community-Import Regimes for Bananas (Case I, II and III OF 1993, 1994 and 1996 
respectively.)  International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) May 2000. 
The WTO seeks to restore confidence after the fiasco of Seattle: 
http://ictsd.org/downloads/passerelles/passerelles2-1.pdf accessed 30 June 2011 
92    Gakumu 'ACP Lome IV Convention'. 
93  Prior to the Cotonou Agreement, there were four successive conventions between the fifteen EU 
countries and the seventy-one countries in the ACP. These were Lome 1, concluded on 28 
February 1975 for a period of five years, which was renewed by Lome II (1980-85), Lome III 
(1985-90) and Lome IV (1990-2000) 
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substantially lower than the normal MFN rate applied to the goods originating in the 
beneficiary countries.94EPAs are considered north to south RTAs and hence 
compliance with the WTO is required. An earlier discussion showed that EPAs came 
into being as a measure designed to make trade between ACP countries and the EU 
WTO compliant. The EPAs sought to replace the Cotonou trade waiver,95 which was 
not based on reciprocity since it gave the ACP preferential treatment for exports into 
the EU market but did not require the ACP countries to grant preferential treatment 
to the EU.96 
 It is very likely that ACP countries will need long transition periods in the EPA 
process. In fact, ACP countries in their submission on RTAs to the WTO have 
requested that periods of at least 18 years be allowed.  A long transition period 
would be crucial for them in the context of EPAs and other future RTAs in order to 
that they should have enough time for their industries to adapt to radically increased 
competition, as well as to introduce necessary measures to compensate for heavy 
tariff revenue loss.  Finally, long transition periods will also be necessary to enable 
African countries to achieve regional integration prior to opening their trade to the 
EU, e.g. SADC's Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) and the 
African Economic Community's 2028 goals. The modalities for transition periods are 
also unclear. What legal regime should be applied during the transition agreement? 
Are interim agreements subjected to some of the obligations of Article XXIV (5) and 
(8) as discussed earlier? How much of the trade between the two parties should be 
liberalised during the transition period and what of the other restrictive regulations of 
commerce?  
5. Conclusion 
In finalising this discussion, it is important to note that the implementation of Article 
XXIV has not worked well in practice. In the 47-year history of the GATT, only one 
                                                          
94
   Onguglo 'Developing countries and trade preferences'  109  
95
  Cotonou Agreement (valid until 2008) and one for the EU's transitional banana regime (valid until 
2006) was a compromise reached involving conceding Latin American countries the right to 
challenge the new banana regime if their current levels of market access was undermined by the 
application of preferences for ACP countries. See Saurombe 'The context of Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPAs) for SADC: Available alternative' in Kierkegaard (ed) Business 
and Law, Theory and Practice. June 2008 
96
    Saurombe The Context of EPA for SADC 362-370 
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working party determined that a regional trading arrangement had satisfied the 
provisions of Article XXIV;97 yet none were found to be incompatible with GATT 
Rules. To emphasise the challenges of Article XXIV, a former GATT Deputy Director 
General complained that of all the GATT Articles, this is one of the most abused, and 
those abuses are among the least noted.98 
Additionally the Leutwiler Group 1985 report to the GATT Director General similarly 
noted that the exceptions and ambiguities which have thus far been permitted have 
seriously weakened the trade rules. They have set a dangerous precedent for further 
special deals, fragmentation of the trading system, and damage to the trade interests 
of non-participants. GATT rules on customs unions and free trade areas should be 
examined, redefined so as to avoid ambiguity, and more strictly applied.99 From this 
analysis it is clear that the GATT Article XXIV rules are very elastic and vague. WTO 
rules on RTAs have largely been futile for the reason that they can be interpreted in 
various ways.100 
Further findings show that treaty obligations that are imposed by general and 
equivocal wordings and provide ample scope of interpretation are always likely to be 
less complied with by states than those obligations that are imposed by precise and 
unequivocal wording.101 Understanding why the GATT sanctioned the formation of 
RTAs and imposed so little discipline on their formation requires further examination 
that goes beyond the scope of this paper. If non-compliance with Article XXIV 
provisions is commonplace, then that could well signal that the treaty provisions 
themselves are defective to some extent. It is doubtful that the drafters of Article 
XXIV fully appreciated its long term challenges. Even though this problem has been 
well documented, the call for reform has been resisted simply because of the fear of 
compromising the already delicate relationship between regionalism and 
multilateralism. The WTO rules relating to RTAs should therefore be clarified if they 
                                                          
97
    This was the 1993 customs union between the Czech and Slovak Republics, two countries that 
had been joined together as an independent state for the previous 75 years. See WTO World 
Trade Report 2007, Six Decades of Multilateral Cooperation: What Have We Learnt? (Geneva, 
WTO2007) 306. 
98  
  Chase, “Multilateralism Compromised" 63. 
99 
   WTO, 1995:63, See also, Sutherland, P et al 'The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional 
Challenges in the New Millennium' Report by the Consultative Board to the Director General. 
www.wto.org (The Sutherland Report 2005) 
100 McMillan (note 44 above) 1-30.1. 
101 
Chayes The New Sovereignty chapter 1 
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are to be implemented to a greater degree. In particular the meaning of the phrases 
'other regulation of commerce' and 'substantially all trade' require clarification. The 
negotiations for reforming Article XXIV at the WTO are going nowhere, but no matter 
how difficult they are, the reforms are necessary if the WTO is to remain a rules-
based system with real authority and if non-discriminatory free trade is not to be 
suppressed by a myriad of RTAs that do not conform to its rules. In these 
circumstances it is hard to determine SADC compliance with the rules. 
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